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rAbstract
Most EaP migrants in Spain come from Ukraine, followed by, to a much lesser extent,
Moldavia, Armenia, and Georgia. Relative to other migrants, they are those who most
recently arrived to Spain. Using data from Spanish Labor Force Survey (LFS) from the
years 2000 to 2011, this paper analyzes how their employment situation evolves with
time in Spain, the type of sectors they work in, and their welfare use, including
unemployment insurance receipt. We find that the employment rate of EaP migrants
is similar to that of the natives. This is because although they face an employment
penalty upon arrival, they catch up quickly. In addition, we document that EaP
migrants, despite their higher educational level, are less likely to work than natives
and other migrant groups upon arrival to Spain. However, the initial disadvantage in
terms of employment and working conditions dissipates over time. We also find that
their use of welfare increases with experience in the country.
JEL codes: J61; J15
Keywords: Immigrant assimilation and Eastern Partnership countriesIntroduction
Over the last decade, Spain has experienced many changes. It has gone from being one of
the most dynamic European economies, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3.4
percent, to experiencing a major reverse after the international financial crisis of 2007, which
burst the Spanish real-state bubble and soared unemployment rate to 24 per cent – the
highest level among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries. Before the collapse of the Spanish economy, the country received an impressive
inflow of immigrants – approximately 500,000 per year between 2002 and 2007 – who were
quick to find jobs in the booming economy and to integrate in its society. As Figures 1 and
2 show, the composition of migrants changed over time, with EU-15 migrants being
overtaken by South Americans and migrants from the EU enlargement member states.
While much is known on how migrants from Africa, Eastern Europe and South America as-
similate in Spain, there is no evidence on the experience of migrants from Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) countries (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)1.
Nonetheless, the number of EaP migrants has increased considerably over the last decade.
There were as few as 4,000 migrants from EaP countries residing in Spain at the
turn of the century, and as many as 127,204 in 2011, representing almost 2 per
cent of the total immigrant population. This paper ’s main objectives are to: (i)
evaluate the importance of EaP migrants’ inflows and stocks in Spain; (ii) identify EaPFarré and Rodríguez-Planas; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Figure 1 Total number of immigrants by source country (main groups of countries). Source: Spanish
Local Population Registry.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/1migrants’ socio-demographic characteristics and compare them to those of natives and other
immigrants; (iii) evaluate the impact of migration from EaP countries on the Spanish labor
market and welfare state; and (iv) identify mechanisms to deal with the skill shortages and
present migration policies to deal with migrant labor market matching. It is important to
highlight that the bulk of EaP immigrants come from Ukraine (i.e. 66% in 2011). Thus our
results and policy implications are largely driven by the behavior of this group.
Our analysis uncovers three important results. First, we find that in contrast with
earlier findings on migrants in Spain, EaP migrants are less likely to work than natives
and other migrants upon arrival. This result is particularly puzzling because the high
education level of EaP migrants relative to both natives and other migrants. A possible
explanation for this is that the strong segmentation of the Spanish labor market makes
it difficult for highly educated migrant workers to find jobs that match their skills
(Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas 2009). Since EaP migrants are largely high-skilled
workers, their higher reservation wage at arrival is likely to explain their lower
employability. As they are high skilled, they may first search for a high-skilled job.
As time goes by and they cannot find such type of job, their need for money makes them
adapt their expectations and increases their willingness to take less-qualified jobs. In0.00
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Figure 2 Percentage of immigrants as a share of total immigrants. Source: Spanish Local Population Registry.
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wages and thus are more likely to access low-skilled jobs (for which there was an excess
supply prior to the real-estate bubble burst in 2007). An alternative and complementary
explanation for the difficult labor market integration of high-skilled EaP immigrants in
Spain is that they face difficulties obtaining Spanish recognition and professional accredit-
ation for their college or professional degrees. Our estimates indicate that the employment
gap with respect to natives dissipates after 10 years in the country, while employment
differences between EaP and immigrants of other origins disappear after 5 years.
Second, a common finding in Spain is that immigrants are much more likely to be
over-educated than similar natives (Fernández and Ortega 2008; Alcobendas and
Rodríguez-Planas 2009). Like these authors, we find that EaP migrants are more over-
educated than natives and other immigrants. We also find that EaP migrants work in more
vulnerable jobs than natives and other migrants, and that although their employment situ-
ation improves over time, convergence is slow. Like other immigrants in Spain, we find that
EaP migrants are concentrated in the domestic and construction sector. While EaP women
are disproportionately employed in the domestic sector as nannies, nurses and housekeepers
(over 50 per cent of them work in this sector), EaP men are mainly employed in the con-
struction sector with about two fifths of EaP men in low-skilled jobs working in this sector.
Third, we find that EaP immigrants assimilate into unemployment benefits over time,
and that they do so at a slightly faster rate than other immigrants. This result suggests
that most EaP immigrants have come to Spain to work, and since they concentrate in
the most vulnerable positions – the most likely to be hit by the recession – they make
use of unemployment benefits once they have the right to do so.
The experience of Spain ought to be of interest to policymakers of other Southern
European countries that share: (i) common cultural affinities, such as strong
family-orientated values associated with a low degree of individualization (Flaquer 2000);
(ii) similar socio-economic circumstances, such as rigid labor and financial markets, an
important underground economy, low productivity growth and excessive borrowing
(Garicano 2008; Andrés 2009); (iii) welfare commonalities, such as the mix of universalis-
tic health-care and education systems with professional pension schemes, the high degree
of institutional fragmentation and the lack of an explicit family policy as evidenced by a
very limited number of family-friendly social provisions (Ferrera 1996; Guillén 1997); and
(iv) a recent preponderance of illegal migration and weak governmental capacity to
regulate immigrants’ inflows (Castles and Miller 2003; Solé 2004).
The structure of this paper follows. Section 1 evaluates the importance of inflows and
stocks of EaP migrants in the Spanish economy. Section 2 identifies EaP migrants’
socio-demographic, labor market and welfare use characteristics, and compares them
to those of natives and other migrants. Section 3 discusses EaP migrants’ legal routes of
migration and legal framework in Spain. Section 4 contains the methodological model
and the main results on how EaP migrants compare to natives and other migrants in
terms of employment and welfare use. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.Sources
The main results in this study are derived from a quantitative analysis conducted by
the authors. We employ two main data sets: The Spanish Labor Force Survey and the
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Spanish Statistical Institute (INE) and covers about 60,000 households (180,000 individuals)
each quarter. It contains detail information on the labor market status and socioeconomic
characteristics of the respondents. We restrict the analysis to the year 2000–2011, that
correspond to the large immigration episode in Spain. The second data set is the Spanish
Local Population Survey conducted also by the Spanish Statistical Office. As we will
describe latter in the paper, the main advantage of this administrative data set is that it
allows us to quantify the stock of immigrants in the country in a given year.
Along the paper we refer to several studies conducted mainly by Spanish researchers
that try to quantify the economic implications of the immigration boom during the
2000s. Other than studies by the two authors of this paper: Farré and Rodriguez-Planas,
we also refer to work by Sara de la Rica, Libertad González, Juan Francisco Jimeno,
Francesc Ortega, among others.1. Inflows and stocks
To analyze inflows and stocks of migrants in Spain we use the Spanish Local Population
Registry, which has the advantage of including undocumented immigrants. As the Spanish
welfare system offered until recently free health care and education to all residents –
including undocumented immigrants – it needs a population registry to keep a record of
all individuals who can access this universal welfare2. As a consequence, it is in immi-
grants’ best interests to register in the Local Population Registry immediately after arriving
in Spain. The registration process does not require proof of legal residence and guarantees
full data confidentiality (i.e. the Spanish Government cannot use information in the
Local Population Registry to deport undocumented immigrants). Moreover, in the
case of an amnesty, the undocumented immigrants can show proof of residence
and date of arrival in Spain – a necessary condition to be considered eligible for the
amnesty – through their registration in the Local Population Registry. Finally, immigrants
are required to update their status every two years, which guarantees the accuracy of the
immigrant population in the Spanish Local Population Registry.
Figure 3 plots the inflow of immigrants from the most popular Eastern European
countries (Bulgaria, Poland and Rumania). We observe a sharp inflow of Romanians in0
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Figure 3 Main Eastern European countries and EaP. Source: Spanish Local Population Registry.
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Spain in 2000, close to 800,000 of them were living in the country a decade later.
Romanians have experienced a particularly interesting status in Spain since 1 January
2007, when their country became part of the European Union. By 2007, Romanians
were the second largest group of immigrants in Spain with 11.2 per cent of the share
(closely following Moroccans, the first largest group of immigrants). Figure 3 also
shows that the inflow of immigrants from EaP countries in Spain resembles that of
Bulgarians and Polish immigrants, with an acceleration of the inflow beginning in 2004
and ending after the great recession.
Table 1 compares immigrants from EaP countries with those from the 12 member
states which joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Data limitations restrict the
comparison to the 2000–2008 period. It shows that the number of individuals from the
EU enlargement member states living in Spain substantially increased between 2000
and 2008, and that immigrants from EaP countries, as a group, are comparable in
magnitude to Bulgarians or Polish.
Figure 4 shows the total number of immigrants in Spain from EaP countries by
country of origin. Most come from Ukraine, followed by, to a much lesser extent,
Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. We observe few immigrants from Belarus and
even fewer from Azerbaijan.
Table 2 shows that, as a group, immigrants from EaP countries accounted for 2 per
cent of the immigrant population in Spain in 2011. Again, it is worth noticing that the
growing inflow since the beginning of the century halted after the great recession.
While the number of immigrants from EaP countries in Spain grew from 4,080 in 2000
to 118,373 in 2008, the increase from 2008 to 2011 was from 124,236 to 127,204. That
said, the number of EaP migrants has not decreased after the great recession.2. EaP Migrants’ socio-demographic characteristics
Unfortunately, the Spanish Local Population Registry has limited information on
immigrants’ socio-demographic characteristics and labor force status. To analyzeTable 1 EaP and the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement
2000 2004 2008
Cyprus 226 234 293
Czech Republic 1,461 3,783 8,322
Estonia 111 506 1,138
Hungary 1,141 2,458 6,973
Latvia 169 1,206 2,452
Lithuania 193 9,163 20,107
Malta 174 187 246
Poland 8,623 27,657 75,757
Slovakia 361 2,477 7,315
Bulgaria 3,266 70,363 150,742
Romania 7,544 206,394 706,164
EaP 4,080 71,720 118,373
Source: Spanish Local Population Registry.
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Figure 4 EaP countries disaggregated. Source: Spanish Local Population Registry.
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quarter of the Spanish Labor Force Survey (LFS) from the years 2000 to 20113. The
Spanish LFS gathers information on demographic characteristics (age, years of education,
marital status and region of residence), and employment characteristics (work status,
occupation and industry). Unfortunately, no information on earnings is available. For
immigrants – defined as foreign-born workers who are not Spanish nationals – the LFS
collects information on the number of years of residence in Spain and the country of
birth. Our analysis focuses on individuals between 16 and 64 years old. We exclude older
individuals to avoid complications involving retirement decisions.
One of the strengths of the LFS is that it is supposed to include both legal and illegal
immigrants, in contrast to alternative datasets that only cover legal ones, such as the
data from the Social Security Records or the Wage Survey Structure. However, the
potential under-reporting of illegal immigrants is likely, especially before an amnesty
(as the LFS is voluntary, in contrast with the Census, which is mandatory). Similarly,
return migration related (or not) to an amnesty may also be worrisome, as both return
migration and under-reporting of immigrants may generate deterministic biases in our
analysis. However, studies suggest that amnesties ought not to be a major concern in
our analysis (see Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica 2007; Fernández and Ortega 2008;
and Rodríguez-Planas 2013).
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for natives and immigrants. It also distinguishes
migrants’ region of origin. Focusing first on EaP migrants, we observe that 56 percentTable 2 Number of individuals born in the EaP countries living in Spain
2000 2004 2008 2009 2010 2011
Armenia 1,169 6,203 10,961 11,392 11,138 10,909
Ukraine 1,879 52,687 78,579 81,243 81,886 84,391
Moldova 190 6,333 15,534 17,174 17,457 17,405
Georgia 465 4,059 9,464 10,868 10,772 10,787
Belarus 267 2,142 3,411 3,559 3,587 3,712
Azerbaijan 110 296 424
Total EaP 4,080 71,720 118,373 124,236 124,840 127,204
Total Immigrants 1,472,458 3,693,806 6,044,528 6,466,278 6,604,181 6,677,839
EaP/Total Immg 0.28 1.94 1.96 1.92 1.89 1.90
Source: Spanish Local Population Registry.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics, natives and immigrants, by region of origin
Natives All Immigrants EaP EU enlargement Africans South Americans
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Sample size 392,983 442,021 27,078 32,437 445 561 3,377 3,862 6,009 5,216 10,215 14,308
Working 0.80 0.49 0.78 0.55 0.78 0.63 0.79 0.63 0.71 0.28 0.80 0.64
Permanent contract 0.50 0.31 0.36 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.14 0.37 0.33
Self-employed 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.05
Welfare recipient 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.08
Unemployment insurance 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.06
Disability pension 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Retired pension 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0
Other pension 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02
High-skill occup 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.08
Medium-skill occup 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.10
Low-skill occup 0.67 0.63 0.75 0.78 0.94 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.82
Male 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.54 0.42
Age 46.65 45.98 39.83 38.79 38.09 37.07 36.25 34.17 40.47 38.58 39.25 38.42
Years since migration 11 10.72 5.88 5.40 5.34 4.87 12.78 11.83 8.54 8.49
Age at migration 28.43 27.50 32.16 31.70 30.90 29.27 26.57 25.05 30.22 29.40
Married 0.84 0.80 0.72 0.68 0.79 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.79 0.81 0.67 0.62
Primary 0.29 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.47 0.56 0.16 0.16
HS dropouts 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.21
HS graduates 0.26 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.34 0.63 0.54 0.23 0.19 0.42 0.41
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics, natives and immigrants, by region of origin (Continued)
College 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.37 0.45 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.21 0.22
With kids 0.43 0.41 0.54 0.56 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.56 0.66 0.57 0.57
Number of kids 1.52 1.51 1.67 1.63 1.44 1.38 1.45 1.43 1.98 2 1.60 1.57
Household size 3.31 3.26 3.25 3.30 3.06 3.07 3.12 3.10 3.52 3.89 3.32 3.29
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The sample is restricted to individuals 16 to 64 years old who are heads of the household or spouses.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/1are women. As expected, EaP migrants are younger than the native population. On
average, they are about 37 years old – about 9 years younger than natives. EaP migrants
are also highly educated, especially when compared to the native population. Over one
third of men and close to one half of women have a college degree and only about one
fifth of them do not have a high-school degree. In contrast, about 16 per cent of natives
have a college degree and almost two thirds have not successfully completed secondary
education. While their household structure resembles that of natives in terms of
average size, some interesting differences emerge. EaP migrants are less likely to be
married and more likely to have children than natives (albeit fewer of them).
Most immigrants come to Spain to work, and EaP migrants are not any different in
this respect. Around three quarters of EaP male and two thirds of EaP female migrants
in Spain work. Of these, between one quarter of men and one third of women do so
under a permanent contract, which guarantees them high severance pay if dismissed. A
differential gender pattern emerges: EaP female migrants are 14 percentage points more
likely to work than their native counterparts. This higher labor force commitment
implies that the share of those who work under a permanent contract is the same as
native women (close to one third of those employed in a wage and salary job). In
contrast, men do not exhibit a higher employment commitment, and the share of EaP
male migrant workers with a permanent contract is, at 26 per cent, half the size of that
observed among natives, which is 50 per cent.
Perhaps surprisingly, given their higher education levels, EaP migrants are primarily
employed in low-earning occupations. As few as 6 per cent of male and 10 per cent of
female EaP migrants work in medium- or high-earning occupations (as shown in
Table 3)4. Where does the typical EaP immigrant work and how is it different to other
migrant groups living in Spain? As EaP and other immigrants are disproportionately
over-represented in low-skilled occupations in Spain, Table 4 presents the list of main
sectors these immigrants work in and their relative importance. While EaP women are
disproportionately employed in the domestic sector as nannies, nurses and housekeepers
(56 per cent of them work in this sector), EaP men are mainly employed in the
construction sector with 42 per cent of EaP men in low-skilled jobs working in
this sector. The domestic sector is also the most common occupation among other
female immigrants (51 per cent of those working in low-skill occupations do so in
that sector). In contrast, while many women from other ethnic groups work in theTable 4 Percentage of immigrants workers employed in the most common low
skilled occupations
EaP immigrants Other immigrants
Men Women Men Women
Food services (cooks, and waiters) 0.96 20.2 7.3 16.4
Sales 1.92 3.71 3.07 7.88
Construction 42.19 0 35.02 0.47
Manufacturing (food preparation, metals, and electrics) 10.24 0 14.19 3.49
Domestic services (nannies, nurses, housecleaning) 2.56 56.23 3.7 51.43
Agriculture and fishing 4.15 3.71 5.26 3.29
Other unskilled jobs (janitors, drivers, warehouse workers) 17.58 4.71 7.31 7.21
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
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sector is limited, probably due to their lower language skills. Finally, both EaP and
non-EaP female migrants are also largely represented in the food-services sector
(as waiters and cooks) with a share of 20 and 16 per cent, respectively.
Table 3 also indicates that EaP migrants are less likely to be welfare recipients or
receive pensions than natives. As Rodríguez-Planas (2013) explains their legal status or
insufficient contribution is likely to hamper participation in social programs in Spain –
a country with a low level of social assistance and a welfare state in which access to
pensions is conditioned on having contributed to social security. The only exception is
the unemployment insurance (UI) receipt of EaP men, which, at 10 per cent, is double
that of native men5.
Relative to other migrants, EaP migrants and migrants from the EU enlargement
member states arrived most recently to Spain. On average, EaP migrants have been in
Spain for a little more than 5 years – about half the average length of African migrants.
Most likely this explains the concentration of EaP migrants and those from the EU
enlargement member states in low-earning occupations relative to their African and
South American counterparts.3. Legal routes of migration and legal framework for EaP migrants
Spain has not had an active policy of attracting immigrants. As early as 1985, it
imposed severe restrictions on non-EU foreigners who wanted to establish Spanish
residency and citizenship6. Beginning in 1993, further tightening took place with
tougher restrictions on work and residency permit renewals and the implementation of
immigration quotas system, which limited the entry of foreigners to about 30,000 per year.
At the turn of the century, Spain updated its immigration legislation, bringing it in line
with other European countries.
However, the free entrance of foreigners as tourists together with a lax implementation
of immigration laws and several generous amnesties that have granted legal residence to
illegal immigrants (1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, and 2005) have converted Spain into an
attractive destination for immigrants. In fact, the most common way of obtaining legal
status in Spain during the past two decades has been through amnesties – often originally
entering either illegally or as tourists (see Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica 2005, 2008;
Dolado and Vázquez 2007; and Izquierdo et al. 2009)7. Between 1985 and 1991, as many
as 150,000 immigrants regularized their status; between 1996 and 2001, a total of 400,000
immigrants did the same; and in the last amnesty, that of 2005, as many as 550,000
immigrants obtained residence permits.
Today, Spain is part of the Schengen zone a group of countries in Europe which have
no internal border controls, so their citizens can cross into the different countries
without showing a passport. As EaP countries are not members of the Schengen
zone, they are treated as other non-EU migrants. This implies that citizens from
EaP countries need a visa to work in Spain in addition to other requirements asked
to non-EU citizens, such as a valid passport, no criminal record, private health
insurance, documentation to justify the purpose of the trip (visiting friends, work
or holiday), a return travel ticket and some financial guarantee (a minimum of € 600). As
a result of the strict entry requirements, a substantial fraction of non-EU citizens enter
Farré and Rodríguez-Planas IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 11 of 282014, 3:1
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visa, followed by an overstay – implying that their legal status in the country has expired.
Many researchers have found that networks of migrants from the same country
facilitate the arrival and assimilation of migrants into the host country. Unfortunately,
the LFS does not ask workers about their networks. However, to explore this we first
analyze whether EaP immigrants have clustered in any particular regions in Spain and
whether these regions differ to those chosen by other migrants. Table 5 shows the top ten
destinations of immigrants in 2002 and 2011 (Panel A displays this information for
EaP migrants and Panel B displays this information for other migrants). When the
immigration boom started in Spain in the early 2000s, EaP migrants were located
in the non-traditional immigrant regions of Albacete, Cuenca and Huelva. While
these regions had an immigration share of about 2 per cent in 2002, the concentration of
EaP migrants was well above 5 per cent. In contrast, the main destinations of
other migrants were Alicante and Balears with an immigrant share of 12 per cent
and 11 per cent, respectively.
By comparing the geographical distribution of immigrants in 2002 and 2011, we can
also gain some insight on the influence of personal contacts on their migration process.
Indeed Albacete and Cuenca are still among EaP migrants’ preferred destinations, while
those are not popular destinations among other immigrants (i.e. in 2011 the migrationTable 5 Immigrants’ preferred destinations, 2002 and 2011
A. EaP immigrants
2002 2011
Albacete 10.74 Cantabria 6.69
Cuenca 6.53 Albacete 4.16
Huelva 5.08 Lleida 4.16
Ciudad Real 4.92 Córdoba 3.39
Cantabria 4.23 Valencia 3.02
Valencia 4.17 Cuenca 2.98
Murcia 3.24 La Rioja 2.94
Lleida 3.22 Murcia 2.84
Huesca 2.82 Girona 2.70
Sevilla 2.41 Tarragona 2.69
B. Other immigrants
2002 2011
Alicante 11.91 Alicante 25.75
Baleares 10.88 Baleares 24.33
Melilla 9.29 Melilla 22.89
Girona 8.98 Almería 22.50
Tenerife 8.25 Girona 21.96
Madrid 8.04 Tenerife 19.96
Málaga 7.83 Málaga 19.82
Palmas 7.31 Madrid 19.59
Almería 7.21 Tarragona 18.96
Murcia 6.81 Lleida 18.66
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
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regions have a migration rate above 20 per cent).
While networks are likely to have an important role in generating the observed
geographical pattern, we cannot rule out that other factors (i.e. regional industry
specialization and individual comparative advantages) are also responsible for the
distribution of immigrants across Spanish regions.
4. EaP Migrants’ labor market and welfare assimilation in Spain
4.1 Empirical specification
This section examines labor market and welfare assimilation of EaP migrants in Spain.
In particular, we analyze whether differences in observable characteristics between EaP
migrants and natives, and EaP migrants and other migrants, and explain the observed
descriptive differences from the previous section. For this purpose, we estimate the
following cross-sectional linear probability model:
Y ijt ¼ α1Xijt þ α2EaPijt þ α3Femaleijt þ α4 EaPijtxFemaleijt
 þ α5YSMijt
þ α6YSM2ijt þ δj þ γt þ t þ tδj þ α7Zjt þ εijt ð1Þ
where i indexes the individual, t the LFS year, and j indexes the state. The variable
Xijt is a vector of person-specific characteristics, which includes the following
socio-demographic controls: age and age squared, marital status, four education dummies
(primary education, secondary education but no high-school degree, high-school graduate
and college education), household size, number of children in the household and
four dummies indicating the age of the children in the household (0–4, 5–9, 10–15
and 16–29 years old). EaPijt is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is an
EaP immigrant, Femaleijt is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is woman,
and (EaPijt x Femaleijt) is an interaction of the two. YSMijt and YSMijt
2 control for years
since migration to Spain (and its square). The specification also includes State
fixed effects (δj)
8, LFS year fixed effect (γt), a time trend (t) and a time trend
interacted by State fixed effects. Zijt is a vector describing labor market characteristics
(at the province level) and includes the following variables: unemployment rate,
share of immigrants, share of immigrants on welfare and share of inactive immigrants at
the province level. A normally distributed error term is represented by εijt.
Along the analysis our empirical model is always estimated on three different
samples. The first includes EaP immigrants and natives, the second contains EaP
immigrants and all other immigrant groups in Spain, and the third limits the comparison
to EaP immigrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 1
for a list of the countries included in this group). As EaP migrants most closely resemble
EU enlargement migrants, we think this last comparison is particularly relevant to policy.
The LHS variable, Yijt, varies according to the aspect of migrants’ assimilation under
analysis. For example, when we examine work assimilation, Yijt is a dummy indicating
whether the individual is working at the time of the survey. Other aspects analyzed
include dummies for: working under a permanent contract; being self-employed; being
unemployed; and receiving cash-welfare benefits – which includes UI benefits, retired
pension and other type of pension, including disability pension9. In addition, to identify
possible skill mismatches and over-qualification, we construct a variable that has the
value 1 if the individual works in a low-earning occupation, 2 if in a middle-earning
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only for individuals working at the time of the survey.
Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 present the results from these regressions. As mentioned,
we are interested in analyzing how EaP migrants compare to natives. Accordingly
equation 1 is estimated on a sample of EaP migrants and natives and the results from these
estimations are in column 1 of Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Columns 2 and 3 repeat the
analysis but compare EaP migrants to other migrants living in Spain (in column 2) and to
other migrants from EU enlargement member states (in column 3).
Our analysis focuses on the coefficients, α2, and (α2 + α4), which capture male and
female differences between EaP migrants and: (i) natives (in column 1); (ii) other
migrants living in Spain in column 2; and (iii) migrants from EU enlargement
member states in column 3, controlling for migrants’ year of arrival in Spain. If
lower employment- or welfare-participation rates among immigrants are simply
due to differences in observable characteristics between EaP migrants and others,
the coefficients, α2, and (α2 + α4), should not be significantly different from zero
when these controls are included in the model.
We also investigate differences in convergence rates in terms of alternative outcomes
across immigrant groups. In doing so, we extend the empirical model in equation (1)
by including an interaction of the EaP dummy with the years since arrival (YSM and
YSM2). See column (2) and (3) of Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.4.2 Main results
Below we summaries the main results from Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 1210.EaP migrants are less likely to work than natives and other migrants, although their
employment situation improves over time
Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of the model in equation (1) where the dependent
variables is an indicator for whether the respondent is working at the time of the interview.
Estimates from column 1 show that on arriving to Spain, EaP male migrants are
32 percentage points less likely to work than their native counterparts (once all observable
socio-demographics have been accounted for). Although the employment gap on arrival is
smaller between female EaP migrants and natives, it is far from negligible – with EaP
women 12 percentage points less likely to work than native women11. As the average
employment rate for EaP men (women) is 78 (63) per cent, our estimates imply that EaP
migrants are 41 (19) per cent less likely to work than their male (female) counterparts
when they first arrive. It is important to note that the gap decreases with experience in the
country, suggesting that EaP migrants assimilate over time. The employment differential
vanishes for men after 11 years and for women after 4. From this point on it begins to
reverse. These patterns (large negative gap upon arrival and relatively fast converge rate
over time) are likely to account for the similarity in average employment observed for
natives and EaP migrants in the descriptive statistics of Table 3.
The male results contrast with those from Spanish migration literature. For instance,
Fernández and Ortega (2008) find that the labor supply of new male immigrants
arriving from Eastern Europe and South America is higher than that of similar
natives. In addition, they find that while the labor supply increases for South
Table 6 Employment assimilation
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −0.321*** −0.156*** −0.156***
[0.051] [0.045] [0.048]
Female −0.303*** −0.195*** −0.151***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.014]
EaP interacted by female 0.203*** 0.097*** 0.059
[0.036] [0.034] [0.038]
Age 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.042***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.005]
Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years since migration 0.029** 0.006*** 0.015***
[0.014] [0.001] [0.005]
Years since migration squared −0.002** −0.000*** −0.001**
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
EaP interacted by years since migration 0.031*** 0.025**
[0.012] [0.013]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared −0.002** −0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Married −0.006*** −0.064*** −0.023
[0.002] [0.006] [0.015]
Presence of children 0.014*** 0.023** 0.007
[0.003] [0.010] [0.027]
Household size −0.010*** −0.012*** −0.022***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.008]
Unemployment rate (province) −0.005*** −0.010*** −0.016***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003]
Share of immigrants (province) 0.003*** −0.001*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Share of immigrants on welfare (province) 0.000 −0.002** −0.002
[0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Immigrant inactivity rate (province) −0.000** −0.006*** −0.004***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Education dummies yes yes yes
Child dummies yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 835,996 50,081 8,168
R-squared 0.258 0.131 0.100
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent is employed at the time of the interview. Estimates
of a linear probability model reported. Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend specific to each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list
of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level respectively.
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Table 7 Permanent employment assimilation
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −0.596*** −0.241*** −0.134***
[0.040] [0.035] [0.040]
Female −0.181*** −0.049*** −0.001
[0.003] [0.006] [0.015]
EaP interacted by female 0.262*** 0.113*** 0.069**
[0.033] [0.031] [0.034]
Age 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.024***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.005]
Age squared −0.001*** −0.000*** −0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years since migration 0.041*** 0.008*** 0.041***
[0.010] [0.001] [0.005]
Years since migration squared −0.001* −0.000*** −0.002***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
EaP interacted by years since migration 0.031*** 0.003
[0.009] [0.010]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared −0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Married 0.015*** 0.031*** 0.003
[0.002] [0.009] [0.010]
Presence of children 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.037
[0.003] [0.009] [0.026]
Household size −0.018*** −0.002 −0.011
[0.001] [0.003] [0.007]
Unemployment rate (province) −0.001* −0.005*** −0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Share of immigrants (province) 0.002*** −0.002*** −0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Share of immigrants on welfare (province) −0.000 −0.003*** −0.003
[0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Immigrant Inactivity rate (province) −0.000 −0.001* 0.000
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Education dummies yes yes yes
Child dummies yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 835,996 50,081 8,168
R-squared 0.158 0.064 0.089
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 if the respondent is working under a permanent
contract and 0 otherwise. Estimates of a linear probability model reported. The sample include both employed and
non-employed workers. Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend specific to each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level.
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Table 8 Self-employment assimilation
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −0.115*** −0.033 0.006
[0.023] [0.023] [0.022]
Female −0.114*** −0.065*** −0.044***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.006]
EaP interacted by female 0.085*** 0.034** 0.013
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017]
Age 0.011*** 0.002* 0.002
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003]
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000 −0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years since migration −0.005 0.009*** 0.005**
[0.004] [0.001] [0.002]
Years since migration squared 0.000 −0.000*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
EaP interacted by years since migration −0.007* −0.005
[0.004] [0.005]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Education dummies yes yes yes
Child dummies yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 835,996 50,081 8,168
R-squared 0.040 0.059 0.044
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 if the respondent is self-employed and 0 otherwise. The
sample include both employed and non-employed workers. Estimates of a linear probability model reported. Additional
controls as in Table 6 and 7 are included (married, presence of children, household size and province controls).
Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend specific to each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list
of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level.
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migrants from the EU enlargement member states, de la Rica (2009) also finds evidence
that the employment situation of these immigrants in Spain deteriorates over time. More
specifically, she finds that while there is no difference in the probability of working for
recent EU-enlargement migrants and natives, non-recent EU-enlargement migrants do
worse in terms of employment than their recent counterparts.
How can we reconcile our results with the rest of the literature? First, we find that
EaP men fare worse at arrival in terms of employment than other migrants. Results
from columns 2 and 3 in Table 6 show that, upon arrival to Spain, EaP male migrants
are less likely to work than their migrant counterparts (including those from EU
enlargement member states). Second, EaP migrants differ considerably from the average
Spanish migrant as they are considerably more educated. More than one third of them
Table 9 Occupational upgrading
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −2.509*** −1.694*** −0.553
[0.375] [0.364] [0.359]
Female −0.140*** −0.244*** 0.045
[0.006] [0.021] [0.076]
EaP interacted by female 0.271 0.371* 0.079
[0.221] [0.221] [0.217]
Age 0.010*** −0.003 0.034
[0.002] [0.011] [0.039]
Age squared 0.000* 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Years since migration 0.153* 0.042*** 0.066***
[0.085] [0.004] [0.022]
Years since migration squared −0.002 −0.000*** 0
[0.004] [0.000] [0.001]
EaP interacted by years since migration 0.129 0.06
[0.084] [0.082]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared −0.003 −0.001
[0.004] [0.004]
Education dummies Yes yes yes
Child dummies Yes yes yes
State dummies Yes yes yes
Year dummies Yes yes yes
Observations 528,169 32,492 5,739
R-squared 0.285 0.250 0.110
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual works in a low-earning occupation, 2 if in a middle-earning
occupation and 3 for a high-earning occupation. The sample include only workers employed at the time of the survey.
Estimates of an ordered probit model are reported. Additional controls as in Table 6 and 7 are included (married,
presence of children, household size and province controls). Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend
specific to each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list
of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level respectively.
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enlargement member states and one fifth of South Americans. Moreover,
Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas (2009) find that, in contrast to low-skilled
workers, immigrants with a university degree are over-represented in the “not-working”
category compared to their native counterparts. The Spanish labor market is strongly
segmented and rigid, making it difficult for high-skilled workers to find jobs that match
their skills. Since EaP migrants are largely high-skilled workers, their higher reservation
wage at arrival is likely to explain their lower employability. In contrast, migrants from
other origins, who tend to be lower skilled, have lower reservation wages and thus are
more likely to access low-skill jobs (for which, there was an excess demand prior to the
real-estate bubble burst in 2007). According to the estimates in column (2) and (3) the
Table 10 Welfare residual
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −0.045 −0.014 0.020
[0.031] [0.031] [0.032]
Female −0.031*** −0.029*** −0.023***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.008]
EaP interacted by female −0.017 −0.010 −0.012
[0.026] [0.025] [0.024]
Age −0.034*** −0.022*** −0.013***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.004]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years since migration 0.021*** 0.005*** 0.012***
[0.007] [0.001] [0.002]
Years since migration squared −0.001** −0.000*** −0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
EaP interacted by years since migration 0.011 0.003
[0.007] [0.008]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared −0.001 −0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Education dummies yes yes yes
Child dummies yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes Yes
Year dummies yes yes Yes
Observations 835,996 50,081 8,168
R-squared 0.143 0.093 0.078
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent receives cash-welfare benefits (i.e. UI benefits,
retired pension and other type of pension, including disability pension). Estimates of a linear probability model reported.
Additional controls as in Table 6 and 7 are included (married, presence of children, household size and province
controls). Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend specific to each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list
of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level respectively.
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5 years in the country12.EaP migrants are less likely to work under permanent contracts than natives and other
migrants, although their employment situation in Spain improves with time relative to
natives and most immigrant groups
Table 7 shows the OLS estimates of the model in Equation (1) where the dependent
variable is an indicator for whether the respondent is working under a permanent
contract and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated on the sample of employed and
non-employed workers. The results indicate that EaP migrants are not only less
Table 11 Unemployment benefits residual
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −0.045* −0.019 −0.004
[0.024] [0.024] [0.025]
Female −0.002*** −0.032*** −0.024***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.008]
EaP interacted by female −0.028 0.002 −0.002
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Age −0.003*** 0.005*** −0.003
[0.000] [0.001] [0.003]
Age squared 0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years since migration 0.020*** 0.006*** 0.012***
[0.006] [0.000] [0.002]
Years since migration squared −0.001* −0.000*** −0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
EaP interacted by years since migration 0.009* 0.005
[0.005] [0.006]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared −0.000 −0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Education dummies yes yes yes
Child dummies yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 835,996 50,081 8,168
R-squared 0.027 0.055 0.074
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2011.
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent receives unemployment benefits. Estimates of
a linear probability model reported. Additional controls as in Table 6 and 7 are included (married, presence of children,
household size and province controls). Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend specific to
each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list
of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level respectively.
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likely to work under more vulnerable conditions. Upon arrival, male (female)
migrants are 60 (34) percentage points less likely to work under permanent
contract than their native counterparts. This gap narrows over time, and takes 15
(8) years for men (women) to vanish, and then reverses. The persistent estimated
disadvantage in terms of permanent employment explains the much lower aggregate share
of EAP migrants employed under this type of contract (see Table 3).
When comparing EaP migrants’ likelihood of working under a permanent contract
with other migrants, we observe a gender differential. While EaP men are 24 percentage
points less likely to work under permanent contract upon arrival than other migrants, the
difference is smaller among women (i.e. 13 percentage points). This differential holds
(albeit smaller) when we compare EaP migrants to those from EU enlargement member
Table 12 Employment assimilation from 2000 to 2007
Relative to
natives
Relative to other
migrants
Relative to migrants from
EU enlargement
(1) (2) (3)
EaP −0.405*** −0.198*** −0.209***
[0.083] [0.075] [0.076]
Female −0.350*** −0.261*** −0.202***
[0.004] [0.008] [0.021]
EaP interacted by female 0.174*** 0.075* 0.033
[0.046] [0.043] [0.050]
Age 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.038***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.008]
Age squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Years since migration 0.100*** 0.005*** 0.035***
[0.038] [0.001] [0.007]
Years since migration squared −0.008** −0.000** −0.002***
[0.004] [0.000] [0.000]
EaP interacted by years since migration 0.079** 0.083**
[0.037] [0.036]
EaP interacted by years since migration squared −0.006* −0.008**
[0.004] [0.003]
Education dummies yes yes yes
Child dummies yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 553,951 20,583 3,244
R-squared 0.290 0.174 0.140
Source: Labor Force Survey 2000–2007.
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent is employed at the time of the interview.
Estimates of a linear probability model reported. Additional controls as in Table 6 and 7 are included (married, presence
of children, household size and province controls). Specifications also included a linear trend and a linear trend specific
to each region.
Samples: Column (1) includes natives and EaP immigrants, Column (2) includes EaP immigrants and all other immigrants,
Column (3) includes EaP migrants and immigrants from the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement (see Table 2 for a list
of countries).
*, ** , *** Estimate significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% level, or 99% level.
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evidence of convergence over time.EaP migrants are less likely to be self-employed than natives
It may be that since they are high-skilled workers, EaP migrants may be more entrepre-
neurial than natives or other migrants. Table 8 reports the estimates of a model where the
dependent variable takes value 1 for self-employed workers and 0 otherwise. Note that the
model is estimated on a sample of employed and non-employed workers. The table does
not report evidence of a higher entrepreneurial activity among EaP immigrants. Upon
arrival, EaP male migrants are 11 percentage points less likely to be self-employed than
natives and this differential does not seem to decrease over time. The initial differential
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smaller than that observed among men (i.e. only 3 percentage points). This is likely to be
partly explained by the fact that as many as 45 per cent of EaP female migrants are college
graduates. We do not observed significant differences in the propensity to be self-employed
across different immigrant groups and the pattern remains constant over time.EaP migrants are over-qualified for their jobs and more so than natives and
other migrants
In addition, to identify possible skill mismatches and over-qualification, we construct a
variable that has value 1 if the individual works in a low-earning occupation, 2 if
employed in a middle-earning occupation and 3 for a high-earning occupation. Table 9
displays the estimated coefficients of an ordered probit model for the occupational
upgrading model. Since the estimated coefficients are those of a non-linear model, to
interpret the results we have computed the marginal effects. Accordingly, upon arrival
to the country EaP migrants have, on average, a 32 percentage points higher probability
of being employed in a low-earning occupation than their native counterparts. In
contrast, the average probability of being employed in a middle-earning or high-
earning occupation is, respectively, 23 and 9 percentage points lower. The initial
differential vanishes after 6 to 8 years in the country for low and middle-earning
occupations, and after 3 years for high-earning occupations.
Differences in the occupational distribution of EaP immigrants and other immigrant
groups are also significant. When compared to all other immigrants, EaP migrants
have a 14 percentage points higher probability of being employed in a low-earning
occupation, while the probability of employment in a middle or high-earning occupation
is, respectively, 9 and 5 percentage points lower. While the magnitude of these differences
is small (relative to that with natives), the gap persists over time and only disappears after
10 to 14 years in the country.
Our findings are consistent with previous evidence reporting that EaP migrants are
more over-educated than natives and other immigrants. Previous studies also find that
the native–immigrant over–education differences are largest for Eastern European
immigrants, which are the ones with the highest levels of education. Estimates from
column 3 in Table 9 show that there are no over-education differences between EaP
and migrants from EU enlargement countries.
Moreover we find that the over-education mismatch between EaP migrants and natives
decreases over time, though it takes several years until it disappears. The persistence of this
negative effect is consistent with the findings from Fernández and Ortega (2008), which
reveal that the over-education gap of male immigrants with comparable natives is
unaffected by the number of years since migration. These findings are also in line with
Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas (2009), who find that the degree of assimilation in Spain
is higher the lower their education level. These authors find that high-skilled immigrants
are over-represented in the “non-qualified” occupation category, which includes jobs such
as, janitors, entry positions in construction work, non-qualified laborers, house-cleaning,
child and elderly caring. Section 6 below presents alternative explanations on why
immigrants are over-represented in low-qualified occupations (regardless of their
educational level) and the lack of upward occupational mobility.
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Table 10 presents the estimates for the model in (1) where the dependent variable is an
indicator of whether the respondent receives cash-welfare benefits (i.e. UI benefits,
old-age pension and other type of pension, including disability pension) and 0
otherwise. The residual welfare gap between EaP migrants and natives in Spain is a
negative (albeit not statistically significant) 4.5 percentage points – shown in column 1 in
Table 10. This negative residual welfare gap upon arrival is consistent with the
Rodríguez-Planas (2013), who finds that immigrants in Spain are less likely than
natives to participate in cash-benefit social programs – even when controlling for
observable characteristics13. The author concludes that the self-selection of immigrants
coming to a relatively ungenerous welfare state (at least in terms of means-tested social
programmers) is likely to be a reason for this result.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient in the “years since migration” variable in
column 1 of Table 10 is positive and statistically significant. Although, on its own, this
estimate may seem to suggest that over time, EaP migrants increase their welfare use
relative to similar natives, when information from column 1 in Table 11 is added, it is
clear that assimilation into welfare is all driven by UI benefits. This is consistent with
Rodríguez-Planas (2013), who finds that there is no assimilation into cash-welfare
benefits in Spain (other than UI benefits). This result contrasts with findings from
other countries – even ones with traditionally not very generous states, such as the
United States.
When comparing EaP welfare use to that of other migrants in Spain, there is no differ-
ential in use neither upon arrival nor over time. All groups tend to become more welfare
dependent over time, though at a similar rate (see the positive coefficient on years since
arrival, while that on the interaction with the EaP indicator is not statistically significant).EaP migrants are less likely to receive UI upon arrival than natives, but this differential
decreases over time
Table 11 presents the estimates of the model where the dependent variable is an indicator
of whether the individual receives unemployment benefits and 0 otherwise. Column 1 in
Table 11 shows that EaP migrants are 4.5 percentage points less likely to receive UI upon
arrival in Spain. This result is consistent with the Spanish social security system,
which being a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system, conditions receipt and level of
unemployment benefits to the worker’s labor history (wages and number of years of
contribution). When we compare UI receipt between EaP migrants and other
migrants upon arrival to Spain, holding all other characteristics constant, we do
not find a statistically significant difference (columns 2 and 3 in Table 11).
We find that EaP immigrants assimilate into unemployment benefits with time spent
in the new country. Two and a half years after arriving, the difference in UI receipt
between EaP migrants and natives disappears and begins to reverse. In contrast,
Rodríguez-Planas (2013) finds that it takes between 6 to 8 years in Spain for the difference
to vanish when all immigrants (not just EaP) are compared to natives. Since EaP
immigrants concentrate in the most vulnerable positions, they are the first to be
hit by recession. Thus, they use unemployment benefits as a supplement of income
once they have the right to do so. This is likely to be part of the explanation for
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evidence of a faster assimilation into welfare by EaP immigrants as compared to other
immigrants, but the differential in converge rates is less than 1%.5. Conclusions
5.1 Impact of EaP migrants on the receiving country
The number of EaP migrants in Spain increased from 4,080 in 2000 to 127,204 in 2011.
Despite the substantial increase in absolute numbers, this group represented only a 2
per cent of the foreign-born population in 2011. Thus, we do not expect them to have
had any important impact on the labor market. Most of the literature on migration
finds a small effect (if any) of migration inflows on the labor market prospects
(employment and wage) of natives with similar skill levels. This result has also
been confirmed for the Spanish case (Carrasco et al. 2008). Given the small size of
the EaP migrants as a group we cannot perform any rigorous econometric analysis.
However, in light of previous evidence, one should not expect any significant effect from
the EaP migrants on the labor market outcomes of natives with similar skill levels.
In contrast, a recent literature has presented evidence of some complementarities
between low-skilled immigrants and high-skilled natives. For the Spanish case,
Farré et al. (2011) show that the massive inflow of immigrants during the last decade
had a positive effect on the labor market participation of high-skilled native women. The
authors show that female migration has substantially decreased the price of domestic
services. In response to this fall in prices, high-skilled women have hired domestic services
and substituted away hours of home production (childcare and housekeeping) by hours of
work in the market. The estimates in Farré et al. (2011) indicate that the large inflow of
immigrants to Spain between 1999 and 2008 led to a 3-percentage-point increase in the
participation rate of highly skilled women with family responsibilities.
As shown in Table 4 EaP female immigrants are disproportionately employed in
domestic services. Thus, this group is likely to have contributed to the increase in the
labor market participation of native women. The share of EaP women over the
immigrant population increased from almost 0 to more than 2 per cent between
1999 and 2008. According to the estimates in Farré et al. (2011), this group would
have been responsible for about a 0.06-percentage-point increase in native female
employment (i.e. a 2 per cent of the total increase in native female employment).
Alternatively, one may wonder how the recession is affecting EaP migrants. To
explore this, we have re-estimated Table 6, but using only the pre-recession years, that
is from 2000 to 2007 (shown in Table 12). When doing so, we observe that, compared
to natives, the employment gap is larger during this period. The reduction in the
employment gap after including the recessionary years may respond to the increase in
the unemployment rate of natives. While the crisis has hit harder those in more vulnerable
positions, which tend to be over-represented by immigrants, if natives are less flexible and
mobile than immigrants because they have higher reservation wages or stronger roots, they
may be strongly affected by the crisis.
How do EaP migrants affect the Spanish pension, health and education systems? It is
important to acknowledge that immigrants come to Spain to work and by doing so they
contribute to the system. In addition, because the immigration boom is a relatively
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working age (Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón 2009). This is particularly true of EaP
migrants as they are younger than migrants from other origins. Moreover, the Spanish
Social Security System is a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system where the pension
level depends mainly on the labor history of the worker (wages, number of years of
contribution and age of retirement). Thus, even if they were over 65 years old, EaP
migrants would not receive old age pension unless they contributed the minimum
15 years required by law. As a consequence, it is likely that immigrants make a positive
contribution to the situation of the national pension system.
Moving now to the effects of EaP migrants to the health care system, Muñoz de
Bustillo and Antón 2009, analyze immigrants’ use of Spanish public health care
insurance using data from the 2003 Spanish Health Survey. They find that immigrants
incur lower health expenditures than natives, even when controlling for observable
characteristics14. Finally, Salinas Jiménez and Santín González 2010, estimate that the total
direct expenditures accumulated by the Spanish national and regional governments from
the school year 2000–2001 to 2006–2007 amount to € 2.570 million Euros, most of which
(about 70 percent) have been concentrated in Andalucía, Cataluña and Madrid. As EaP
migrants represent 2 percent of all migrants, they have increased the Spanish educational
expenditures by no more than € 51,4 million Euros.5.2 Reasons for the mismatch between skilled EaP migrants and their low-skilled jobs
Rodríguez-Planas (2012) discusses potential alternative and (possibly) complementary
explanations of why skilled migrants in Spain are concentrated in low-skilled jobs.
These explanations would of course also apply to EaP migrants. We summarize them
below. The first explanation for why skilled migrants are concentrated in low-skilled
jobs is the structural nature of the Spanish economic growth in the last decade,
combined with the weak governmental capacity of regulating immigrant inflows.
The second is the imperfect transferability of human capital acquired abroad,
which implies that the higher the homeland education the greater the gap between
the native and the immigrant’s human capital. Third, in an economy with a segmented
labor market and with a large informal sector as the Spanish economy, it is easier to
converge towards the occupational distribution of low-skilled workers, but extremely hard
to penetrate the high-skilled labor market. The fourth reason is the need for certification.
Several occupations that require high levels of education also require certification in the
destination country. This is clearly the case in the Spanish labor market – and not only
for architects, physicians or lawyers, but also for electricians and plumbers. A fifth
explanation is that immigrants may affect the labor market decisions of natives
with different skills through the presence of complementarities. In such case, there
would be a shift towards less manual jobs among the native population compared
to a shift in the opposite direction for immigrants. Several recent papers have
highlighted that native and immigrant workers of similar educational attainment
specialize in different occupations and therefore do not compete for the same jobs,
explaining the small effect the inflows of immigrants on the wages of the less-educated
natives in the U.S. (Gianmarco et al. 2012) as well as in Spain (Carrasco et al. 2008,
Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas 2009, and Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica 2013).
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labor market attainments for member of visible minority groups.5.3 Skill shortages and potential for labor market matching with EaP immigration
Since the great recession, the Spanish economy has suffered a major reverse. The burst
of the real-estate bubble, a failing banking system, a lack of liquidity and loans for
firms, and a rigid labor market have driven the economy to a double-dip recession
within four years. The change of government by the end of 2011 has shifted the social
welfare priorities and has changed the regulation so that universal health care is no
longer readily available to legal and illegal immigrants. As a consequence the inflow of
immigrants has come to a halt, regardless of their nationality. In addition, the soaring
unemployment rate is pushing both immigrants and natives to leave the country as
employment perspective becomes meager. Within this context, the following two major
concerns arise. First, the rising unemployment benefit costs due to very large numbers
of people losing their jobs during the current recession; and second, the risk of social
exclusion with the well-known medium- to long-term consequences of social and
cultural integration of immigrants due to their vulnerable situation and the scarcity of
social assistance available in Spain.
How have immigrants coped with the soaring job destruction rates observed in
Spain? Because immigrants are concentrated in sectors of the economy that were the
most vulnerable during the recession (i.e. construction), and partly because migrants
tend to be younger and have less job security than natives, it is likely that they are the
first to be laid off. However, the overall stock of (EaP) migrants has not decreased as
much as expected given that the unemployment rate in Spain has soared to over 25
percent. Indeed, as of 2011, we have not observed the massive return of immigrants to
their country of origin even after losing their jobs (Lopez 2011).
As a reaction to the crisis, the Spanish authorities introduced the Plan de Retorno
Voluntario – a pay-to-go system introduced in June 2008, which gives unemployment
benefits to non-EU nationals who agree to return home. However, this program had
only recorded 11,660 applications by April 2010 (compared to the anticipated 87,000
applications) and only 8,451 immigrants actually returned home (Lopez et al. 2011). Furthermore,
the fact that the overall stock of EaP migrants has not decreased as much as expected also
suggests that the incentive programmers to foster return migration put in place by the
Spanish government have not worked. Several factors may explain this, including: (i) the
fear of return, which may be considered as a personal failure; (ii) the fact that some
migrants have now their family, social and emotional network in Spain; (iii) a poor
economic situation in their country of origin; and (iv) fear that re-entry would be difficult
due to tough border control/legal restrictions15.
Despite the dramatic unemployment numbers, there are still some occupations which
are difficult to fill. Each quarter the regional authorities publish a list of “difficult to
cover occupations”16. Prior to 2008, it was hard to find workers to cover the large
number of vacancies in the construction and the restoration sector. Nowadays, the
uncovered vacancies are in the fishing and the maritime sector. Those jobs require
technical skills to deal with sophisticated machines and availability to spend much
time travelling (i.e. on board).
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emigration and an ageing population. As a result of the recession many skilled
natives (i.e. engineers, business persons and architects) are leaving to find better
job opportunities in Western Europe, the United States or the booming economies
in Latin America. Analysts are not very optimistic about the recovery of the
Spanish economy, thus most of those emigrant workers are not likely to return. In
turn, skilled immigrants, with lower reservation wages, such as EaP migrants, are
good candidates to cover those vacancies. In addition, the ageing population will
increase the demand for elderly care services. The Spanish experience suggests that
immigrants, and in particular women, will fill these vacancies, at least during their
first years upon arriving in Spain.
Given the current situation of the Spanish economy, a liberalization of the immigration
law is very unlikely to occur. However, the government should establish bilateral
agreements with EaP countries to cover the anticipated labor demand shortages.
For example, workers can be hired with a fix-term contract to fill labor shortages
in the care sector. Some policies should also be implemented to replace Spanish
skills migration. In this direction, permanent or high-incentive contracts should be
offered to attract educated workers with technical degrees.Endnotes
1The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is an initiative of the European Union intended to
provide a venue for discussion of trade, economic strategy, travel agreements and other
issues between the EU and its eastern neighbors.
2Note that since September 2012 there are some restrictions regarding the eligibility
for health care coverage among immigrants. For example, immigrants without legal
residence (i.e. illegal immigrants) are not covered.
3As is common practice in the research using this dataset, we only use the second
quarter to avoid repeated observations. The LFS is carried out every quarter on a sample
of around 60,000 households. Each quarter, one sixth of the sample is renewed. However,
the dataset does not include a variable that allows identification of individuals along the
six consecutive interviews.
4High-earning occupations are directors, managers, scientific technicians, professionals
and academics. Middle-earning occupations include: technicians and support professions;
accountancy, administrative and other office employees; and craftsperson and skilled
workers in manufacturing and construction. Low-skilled occupations include workers in:
catering, personal and protections services and sales; agriculture, livestock, forestry and
fishing; installation and machinery operators and assemblers; and other elementary
occupations.
5To be able to receive UI benefits in Spain you have to be registered in the Social
Security records, under 65 years old, unemployed and have contributed to social security
for at least 12 months (not necessarily consecutive).
6To have the legal status, immigrants were required to acquire a work and residency
permit that restricted them to a particular activity and geographic area only for a year.
In addition, immigrants were not granted any social benefits, despite paying social
security taxes when employed.
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following: (i) residence since 1 June 1999; (ii) having held a work permit any time
during the three-year period preceding 1 February 2000; (iii) being denied asylum
before February 2000; (iv) having applied for any type of residence permit before
30 March 2000; or (v) family ties to legal residents or to individuals in any of the
previous categories.
8State refers to the 17 Autonomous Community region.
9We cannot include housing, schooling or health-care benefits are these are not
measured in the LFS.
10We refer the reader to Table 3 for the descriptive statistics of the variables in the
analysis.
11We obtain the estimate of 12 percentage points by adding 0.32 and −0.20.
12See the estimated coefficient on the interaction of years since migration (YSM and
YSM^2 ) with the EaP indicator. An alternative explanation proposed by Borjas is that
more recent cohorts are worse than earlier ones. However, as this was a wave of
mass migration within just a few years, this critique is probably of lesser importance in
this case.
13Rodríguez-Planas (2013) includes the following benefits as cash-welfare : (i)
unemployment benefits; (ii) disability pensions; (iii) survivor’s pension; (iv) family
allowance; and (v) other social programs.
14According to the raw data, immigrants are more likely to visit the family doctor and
go to the emergency room than natives. Similar results are found by Jiménez et al. 2009.
15Ukraine, the source country of the majority of EaP immigrants to Spain, is immerse
in a deep economic recession due to a weak external demand and delays in policy
adjustments.
16http://www.sepe.es/contenido/empleo_formacion/catalogo_ocupaciones_dc/pdf/
CatalogoOcupacionesDificilCobertura.pdf.
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